Genetically Modifying Livestock for Improved Welfare: A Path Forward

In recent years, humans’ ability to selectively modify genes has increased dramatically as a result of the development of new, more efficient, and easier genetic modification technology. In this paper, we argue in favor of using this technology to improve the welfare of agricultural animals. We first argue that using animals genetically modified for improved welfare is preferable to the current status quo. Nevertheless, the strongest argument against pursuing gene editing for welfare is that there are alternative approaches to addressing some of the challenges of modern agriculture that may offer ethical advantages over genetic modification; namely, a dramatic shift towards plant-based diets or the development of in vitro meat. Nevertheless, we provide reasons for thinking that despite these possible comparative disadvantages there are important reasons for continuing the pursuit of welfare improvements via genetic modification.

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Notes

There are, however, some interesting questions that could arise in relation to companies patenting gene edits and how this would affect consumers and farmers. For more on this, see Gifford (2010).

Thanks to two reviewers for this point. We thank Dan Weary for this example.

In fact, we have preliminary data that bolsters our case. In a survey using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, we found that a majority of participants accepted the use of genetic modification to create hornless cows. In another set of questions, we found that describing modifications as being done for the purpose of improving welfare appeared to influence participants’ responses towards being more favorable.

We are classifying Ortiz’s argument in a manner that is different than Thompson’s original article. Thompson situated his argument in the first category, but we include it here because Ortiz repeatedly references the idea that the changes will interfere with what is for an animal’s “own good” (2004, p. 115) even if they do not diminish welfare.

As one of our reviewers notes, integrity might function in a different way, serving as a “tiebreaker” in cases of comparable welfare but never overriding considerations of welfare. This is an interesting idea, but Bovenkerk et al. and Ortiz both suggest that welfare can sometimes be overruled by considerations of integrity or dignity, respectively. Moreover, since we are specifically considering cases where, by hypothesis, the welfare of animals is improved in virtue of the modification, this suggestion doesn’t cause any problems for our arguments.

Of course, there are features of the biological world that can be morally problematic, but the point here is that species seem to be valued precisely because they represent some natural feature of the world; mutations and divergences from the central tendency seem to have just as much claim to representing a natural feature of the world as do species.

Another suggestion is that we could simply choose to move away from current intensive confinement conditions and back towards models where livestock are able to graze freely for most of their lives. While this could work in particular contexts and on a smaller scale, it does not seem to be a plausible option if the global population continues to grow as expected and meat consumption trends continue. As such, this could be considered part of a solution, but most likely would need to be combined with a general shift toward plant-based diets or some other type of solution. And, by itself, this would not seem to address the fact that even organic and small scale farming operations raise challenges for the environment and land-use decisions.

Some take this claim further and suggest that improving animal welfare will actually impede the ultimate social change needed to reach a morally tolerable state by putting a band-aid over the problem and appeasing public concerns. These claims are always highly speculative, and one might alternatively claim that getting the public to think more about welfare will in fact lead to even further changes down the road. It’s difficult to know how to evaluate such speculative claims and as such it seems highly dubious to ever use them to block concrete improvements in welfare.

It is worth noting, as one of our reviewers pointed out, that Rollin’s Principle of Conservation of Welfare is more restrictive than current policies and practices related to selective breeding. Hopefully, the moral controversy surrounding genetic modification can help ensure that new practices are held to higher standards.

References

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank David Fraser, Marina von Keyserlingk, Clare Palmer, Marcus Schultz-Bergin, Gary Varner, Dan Weary, Heather Yong, two anonymous reviewers, and the audience at the Bovay Workshop on Engineering and Applied Ethics at Texas A&M University for helpful comments on versions of this paper.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. W. Maurice Young Centre for Applied Ethics, School of Population and Public Health; and Animal Welfare Program, Land and Food Systems, University of British Columbia, Vancourver, Canada Adam Shriver
  2. Applied Animal Biology Program, Land and Food Systems, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada Emilie McConnachie
  1. Adam Shriver